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The developmental model of subjective group dynamics hypothesizes that peer exclusion during middle
childhood involves inferences about group dynamics. To test the generality of this prediction, children judged,
withinminimal groups, peerswhose behaviorwas loyal versus disloyal (Study 1: n5 46,mean age5 113months)
ormorally acceptable versus unacceptable (Study 2: n5 121,mean age5 90months). As hypothesized, in Study 1,
children used their understanding of loyalty norms as a basis for evaluating peers. In both studies, higher
commitment to the in-group increased use of group-based criteria for judging peers. In Study 2, children
employed moral- and group-based criteria independently for judging peers. Multiple classification skill was
associated with lower intergroup bias and greater use of morality-based judgment.
Children who are rejected by their peer group expe-
rience a wide range of negative consequences that
affect their psychological development (Asher&Cole,
1990; Graham & Juvonen, 1998; Rubin, Bukowski, &
Parker, 1998). Developmental research has focused
largely on the individual social deficits of the excluder
(e.g., misreading of social cues) or the child being
excluded (e.g., being shy, fearful, or wary; Bukowski
& Sippola, 2001; Juvonen & Graham, 2001). However,
social exclusionmaynot solely reflect social deficits or
psychopathology of individual children. A relatively
underinvestigated area in developmental research
is the role of group and intergroup dynamics in
peer inclusion and exclusion (cf. Abrams, Hogg, &
Marques, 2005). Recent developmental research has
focused on the role of group membership, social
experience, and the intergroup context in peer rejec-
tion (Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, & Ferrell, 2007;
Jackson, Barth, Powell, & Lochman, 2006; Juvonen,
Nishina, & Graham, 2001, 2006; Killen, McGlothlin, &
Lee-Kim, 2002). This work suggests that when inter-
group relationships are salient, children exclude
peers who challenge relevant in-group norms and
undermine the value or reputation of the in-group.
The present article reports two studies based on
a developmental model of subjective group dynamics
(DSGD; Abrams & Rutland, 2008; Abrams, Rutland, &
Cameron, 2003; Abrams, Rutland, Cameron, & Mar-
ques, 2003; Abrams et al., 2007). These studies exam-
ine children’s intergroup biases and peer preferences
when evaluating individual peer groupmembers that
breach group loyalty norms (Study 1) or moral
principles (Study 2). For the first time, a minimal
intergroup setting is used to test the generality of
predictions regarding the relationship between peer
and intergroup judgments.
The Developmental Model of Subjective Group Dynamics
In the social psychological literature, the subjective
group dynamics (SGD) model (Abrams, Marques,
Bown, & Henson, 2000; Marques, Abrams, Pa`ez, &
Martinez-Taboada, 1998;Marques,Abrams,&Seroˆdio,
2001) proposes a dynamic relationship between judg-
ments about groups as a whole and judgments
about individuals within a group. First, the model
contends that evaluation of group members in inter-
group situations reflects the desire to sustain the
value and validity of in-group norms. For example,
deviant (nonconforming) individuals within the in-
group are judged negatively compared to similarly
deviant out-group individuals (i.e., the ‘‘black sheepThis research was funded by a grant from the Economic and
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effect’’—Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). This
subjective phenomenon is akin to what occurs during
the dynamics of real-life face-to-face groups, with
efforts to differentiate between individuals and con-
strain deviants in order to reinforce the boundaries of
groupnorms (e.g., Levine, 1989; Schachter, 1951). This
differentiation among individuals within groups
(termed ‘‘differential evaluation’’ of members) is
motivated by identification with the in-group (social
identity) and the desire for positive in-group distinc-
tiveness (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The combination of
these two processes forms the basis of SGD.
These ideas were extended by Abrams, Rutland,
and Cameron (2003) who proposed and empirically
tested aDSGD. Explanations of key variables from the
DSGD model are set out in Table 1. Across several
studies, evidence about judgments of groupmembers
who deviate from the norm of loyalty (Abrams &
Rutland, 2008; Levine&Moreland, 2002) supports the
proposition that during middle childhood, inter-
group bias and differential evaluation of peers
become more systematically integrated such that
evaluations of specific peers reflect the motivation
for a positive social identity (cf. Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
A key developmental process implicated in this
integration is held to be differential inclusion—chil-
dren’s understanding about how peers will judge
normative and deviant group members from the in-
group and the out-group. Differential inclusion is
based on children’s understanding that groups value
behavior, which upholds their own norms and goals
relative to those of opposing or contrasting groups.
For example, children showing high levels of differ-
ential inclusion appreciate that a disloyal out-group
member is simultaneously liable to be relatively
unattractive to other out-group peers and relatively
attractive to in-group peers, whereas the reverse is
true of a disloyal in-group member.
For children to infer that groups engage in dif-
ferential inclusion involves an appreciation that
in-groups and out-groups will have different per-
spectives on the same behavior depending on both the
intergroup context and themembership of the person
engaging in that behavior. Their understanding of
these complexities may require both learning from
social experience and also the development of social-
cognitive abilities such as perspective taking and
multiple classification ability (Abrams & Rutland,
2008; Quintana, 1994, 1998; Ruble, Alvarez, Bachman,
Cameron, Fuligni, & Coll, 2004).
It seems likely that social experience with groups
may be required for children to be able to infer more
general ‘‘ground rules’’ of group membership. These
ground rules that adults take for granted include
things such as the idea that members should be loyal
to their groups, that groups will act to enforce their
own norms, and that people may be judged not just
because of the group they belong to but because of the
way their behavior or attitudes relate to differences
between their own and other groups (cf. Zdaniuk &
Levine, 2001).
DSGD studies conducted in intergroup contexts
that used national groups (Abrams, Rutland, &
Cameron, 2003) and summer school groups (Abrams,
Rutland, Cameron, & Marques, 2003; Abrams et al.,
2007) have shown that the relationship between
differential inclusion and differential evaluation
tends to be reliable after the age of around 7 years.
In addition, differential inclusion and differential
evaluation are more strongly linked when children
are more motivated to support their in-group (i.e.,
show high intergroup bias or identify more strongly).
Minimal Groups
Previous tests of the DSGD model have all been
conducted in the context of intergroup relationships
that involved real groups. As a result, it is conceivable
that children might have learned specific norms
associated with those groups and that the findings
do not generalize either to other real groups or to
children’s understanding or expectations of group
members’ behavior in general. Consequently, to
examine the generality of the developmental pro-
cesses, it is important to establish whether they
arise in intergroup relationships with which children
will have had little or no direct experience. Therefore,
the present research employs the minimal group
paradigm (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; cf.
Tajfel & Turner, 1979) to eliminate the possibility that
previous findings reflect behavior that applies only
to particular intergroup relationships. Specifically,
childrenwere assigned ostensibly randomly to ‘‘star’’
and ‘‘diamond’’ groups (all were actually in the
diamond group) and were asked to evaluate pairs of
anonymous normative and deviant members from
those groups in a fully factorial within-participants
design. These groupsmeet the criterion of ‘‘minimal,’’
in the sense that there is no interaction among
members, members are completely anonymous to
one another, and there is nodirect connection between
outcomes for the participants and outcomes for the
other members.
There is developmental research that makes use of
arbitrary categorizations such as T-shirt color (e.g.,
Bigler, Brown, & Markell, 2001; Bigler, Jones, &
Lobliner, 1997), but this is not altogether minimal
because the children are aware of one another’s
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identity and have time to build interpersonal relation-
ships between and within groups. Other studies have
created random groups based upon supposed draw-
ing ability (e.g., Nesdale, Durkin, Maass, & Griffiths,
2005) though these are also not completely minimal
because the studies typically manipulate the status of
the groups and often include real categories such as
ethnicity and gender and/or show pictures of indi-
vidual group members. The present research there-
fore adds to the relatively scarce evidence of how
children in middle childhood behave in a highly
minimal intergroup setting (cf. Abrams, 1985;
Vaughan, Tajfel, & Williams, 1981).
In addition, the present research includes alloca-
tion measures of bias that have not been used in
previous tests of the DSGD model. Allocation meas-
ures are commonly used in adult minimal groups
research (Gagnon & Bourhis, 1996), which presents
up to 12 ‘‘matrices’’ on which participants assign
points or money to anonymous pairs of in-group
Table 1
Measures, Derived Variables, and Hypotheses for Studies 1 and 2
Variables and hypotheses Computation of measures
Intergroup biases
(both studies)
Evaluation bias: liking for in-group
minus liking for out-group
(possible range 4 to +4, higher
score 5more bias in favor of in-group)
Allocation bias: candy allocated to in-group
relative to out-group (Twice  5 Bags).
Possible range 5 0 – 10.
Score above 5 5more to in-group
Study 1 Study 2
Differential inclusion Mean perceived inclusion by peers of normative minus
deviant members within their groups and deviant
minus normative members of opposing groups.
Higher score5 larger differences in the acceptability
of normative and deviant members to same and
opposing groups, respectively
Group-based inclusion: inclusion of both
members in the same group minus inclusion
of both members in the opposing group.
Higher scores 5more inclusion of members
by their own groups
Morality-based inclusion: inclusion of both
moral members in both groups minus
immoral members in both groups. Higher
scores 5more inclusion of the moral
members
Differential evaluation Mean evaluation of in-group (normative minus deviant)
and out-group (deviant minus normative). Higher
score5 greater favorability toward members within
each group that show relatively greater endorsement
of the in-group
Group-based evaluation 5mean evaluation of
in-group members minus out-group
members.
Morality-based evaluation 5mean evaluation
of moral members minus immoral members
Differential allocation Mean allocation of book vouchers to in-group
(normative minus deviant) and out-group (deviant
minus normative). Higher score 5more generous
allocation (possible range 5 0 – 15 per member)
Group-based allocation5mean allocation to in-
group minus out-group members.
Morality-based allocation 5mean allocation to
moral minus immoral members
Hypotheses Intergroup – intragroup differentiation: intergroup bias
should be positively related to differential evaluation
and allocation
Domain independence: group- andmorality-based
judgments should be unrelated to one
another
Inclusion-related judgment: differential inclusion should
be positively related to differential evaluation
Domain specificity: within each domain (group,
moral), inclusion and evaluation judgments
should be significantly related to each other.
Intergroup bias and social identity should
only affect the group domain
Motivational: the relationship between differential
inclusionanddifferential evaluation shouldstrengthen
as a positive function of intergroup bias or identity
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and out-group members. Although it is not hypoth-
esized that the pattern of results should differ from
those on previously used evaluative measures, this
has yet to be established within a test of the DSGD
model. In addition, by using both types of measure, it
is possible to distinguish whether correlations among
the bias measures and other variables are attributable
to common measurement formats (e.g., smiley face
scales) rather than relationships between constructs
(e.g., bias and inclusion).
In summary, an important innovation of the pres-
ent research is that, because the groups are minimal,
differential inclusion cannot be based on children’s
direct experience of loyalty or preexisting norms
about behavior toward a specific group. Hence, the
present research provides a strong test of the idea that
children can apply a subjective ‘‘theory’’ or model of
group dynamics when they evaluate peers and make
intergroup judgments (Abrams & Rutland, 2008).
Study 1 was designed to conduct such a test using
the domain of loyalty – disloyalty as used in previous
studies involving real groups (e.g.,Abramset al., 2007).
Study 2 extends the paradigm to investigate children’s
judgments of deviance in a new domain—that of
moral behavior. Based on social-cognitive domain
theory (Turiel, 1998), Study 2 tests the idea that
children independently and simultaneously employ
morality- and group-based criteria for judgments
about the same peers. In addition, Study 2 examines
a hypothesis basedon cognitivedevelopmental theory
(Aboud, 1988, 2003; Bigler & Liben, 2006, 2007). Given
that young children tend to focus on simple category
distinctions rather thanusingmultiple categorizations
in their social perceptions, it should be cognitively
challenging for them to engage in both intergroup bias
and differential evaluation of members at the same
time. Consequently, one might expect multiple cate-
gorization ability to be implicated in developmental
differences in both the intergroup judgments and the
differential evaluations central to SGD.
Study 1: Loyalty
In Study 1, children evaluated normative and deviant
peers from both the in-group and the out-group in
a minimal group context. Previous DSGD research
(e.g., Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron, 2003) has shown
that from 7 to 8 years, children begin to use their
understanding of differential inclusion within real
groups more systematically when they make their
own evaluations of normative and deviant peers from
those groups (i.e., differential evaluation). The pres-
ent study focused on children in this age range to
examine whether they apply generic group loyalty
norms that are not specific to groupswith an objective
history of social relationships.
Study 1 tested the following DSGD hypotheses
(Table 1). Children who express stronger intergroup
bias should also show stronger differential evaluation
in favor of in-group-supporting members of both the
in-group and the out-group (intergroup – intragroup
differentiation hypothesis). Differential inclusion and
differential evaluation should be positively related
(inclusion-related judgment hypothesis). These build to
a third hypothesis that the relationship between
differential inclusion and differential evaluation
should be larger when children’s motivation to sup-




The design was fully within participants involving
two factors, each with two levels. These were the
members’ group (in-group vs. out-group) and
whether members were wholly loyal (normative)
versus partially disloyal (deviant).
Participants were 23 females and 23 males (mean
age5 9 years 5 months, SD5 18.6 months) attending
a summer school program. Participants were all
English and similar in race, ethnicity, and socioeco-
nomic status. They were drawn from a district within
which 96.6% of the population is classified as White
British in the UK Census. The locality is ranked 190th
of 354 in the English Indices of Multiple Deprivation.
Compared with the national average (51%), 68.3% of
households were classified as of medium to high
socioeconomic status. Thus, the children were pre-
dominantly from middle-class backgrounds. They
were tested individually by a female experimenter.
All participants had consent from their parent or
guardian to participate.
Procedure and Materials
Most of the questions required children to tick
a face on a 5-point feeling face scale. Some practice
questions introduced the scales (Abrams, Rutland, &
Cameron, 2003) that presented faces with the mouth
in a downward position (5 1) through horizontal
(5 3) to a large smile position (5 5). Participants
were informed that we were making teams of chil-
drenwhowould later compete against each other for
prizes. There was a ‘‘diamond team’’ and a ‘‘star
team,’’ and ostensibly, the participant’s team would
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be determined bywhich shape he or she happened to
pick out of a cloth bag. Laminated pictures of
a diamond and a star were used to portray the two
minimal groups. In the bag, there were several
square laminated cards with only diamond shapes
printed on them so that all participants were actually
assigned to the diamond team. Participants were
told that they could hold on to the diamond picture
while they answered the questionnaire. Participants
were then asked which team they were on as
a memory check. Any participant who responded
incorrectlywas corrected aboutwhich teamhe or she
was a member.
Intergroup measures. The first question was a group
allocation measure. Participants were asked to allocate
bags of candy to the teams by drawing a diamond
shape or a star shape under each cartoon drawing of
five pictures of candy to represent to which team they
wanted to give each bag. Participants were instructed
that they could give all the bags of candy to one team
or split them out between the teams however they
wanted to. The purpose of this measure was to pro-
vide a nonevaluative measure of in-group bias that
was somewhat comparable to points or money allo-
cation tasks used in the minimal group paradigm
with adults and previously with older children
(Abrams, 1985; Hogg & Abrams, 1988).
Participants then answered group evaluation ques-
tions to evaluate the two teams: ‘‘How much do you
like the diamond team?’’ and ‘‘Howmuch do you like
the star team?’’ Responses were measured by the
‘‘feeling faces’’ scale described previously.
The next question was another group allocation
measure identical to the first, except that the pictures
showed different bags of candy. The reason for
separating the allocation measures was to ensure that
therewas some independence between the two sets of
allocations. Each allocation on its own forced children
to favor one group over the other. If children wanted
to be fair, they could easily do so by switching
preferences in the second allocation task. No children
raised questions about the repetition.
Intragroup measures. The following pages included
descriptions of four groupmembers. Twowere on the
same teamas the participant (in-group), and twowere
on the other team (out-group). On each team, there
was a loyal (normative) member, who made positive
statements about their team, and a ‘‘deviant’’ mem-
ber, who made positive statements about both teams,
thereby showing some disloyalty to their own. This
procedure followed that used by Abrams et al. (2007)
to ensure that deviant members from the in-group
and out-group teams were effectively identical to one
another.
Groupmemberswere referred to by their initials so
that they were gender neutral. Participants were told
that ‘‘ND’’ and ‘‘JR’’ were on the diamond team. They
were told regarding the in-group normative peer that
‘‘ND said ‘I think the diamond team is the best team. I
will always support the diamond team and cheer for
them.’’’ The in-group deviant description read ‘‘JR
said ‘I think the diamond team is a fantastic team. But
I will support and cheer for the star team when they
do well.’’’ For the out-group members on the star
team, the normative peer was called ‘‘PT’’ and made
the same statement as the in-group normative peer
except about the star team instead of the diamond
team. The deviant out-group peer was called ‘‘MS’’
and made the same statements as the in-group
deviant except about the star team.
Stick drawings of each peer were presented with
each description. Throughout the questionnaire, the
shape representing the member’s team and that
member’s initial appeared on the body of the stick
figure to remindparticipants of themember’s identity
and group. Laminated pictures of the members were
used on the following pages during the evaluations
for each member. The order of in-group or out-group
members was counterbalanced, but the normative
peer in each group was always presented before the
deviant member.
Next, each peer was presented again separately in
the order that they were initially presented, and
participants were asked questions about each one.
After reading the description again, participants were
asked to indicate the member’s team as a memory
check. Feedback was given for any incorrect answers.
Member evaluations were measured by asking
‘‘How do you feel toward [peer member]?’’ Group
inclusionwasmeasured by asking ‘‘Howdo you think
other children on the diamond team would feel
towards [peer member]?’’ and ‘‘How do you think
members of the star team would feel towards [peer
member]?’’
Participants then completed a member allocation
task. In this task, participants were instructed, ‘‘We
have some book vouchers and want your help decid-
ing how many to give to each person. I’m going to
show you two of the people that I told you about
before, and I want you to decide how many book
vouchers each person should have. Each time I show
you two people, you have to use five of the book
vouchers. You can use which ever of the book
vouchers you want and give them how youwant—so
you can give them all to one person or split them out.’’
Participants were shown twomembers at a time in all
possible combinations, creating six comparisons. Par-
ticipants allocated vouchers to the members by
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placing five of the laminated vouchers on top of the
pictures of the members. This task was used to pro-
vide a nonevaluative measure of intragroup bias that
also permitted direct comparison between each pos-
sible pair of members.
Results
Prior to further analysis, all dependent variables
were examined for differences associatedwith gender
or order of presentation. Consistent with findings
from previous DSGD research, none were significant.
Therefore, these variables were not examined further.
Intergroup Measures
Overall evaluations of each group (Table 2) differed
significantly, showing intergroup bias in favor of the
in-group (Mbias 5 1.20, SD 5 1.69), t(45) 5 4.79, p ,
.001, g2 5 .34. Similarly, allocations to each group
differed from the equality point of 5 in favor of the
in-group (M5 6.17, SD5 1.34), t(45)5 5.95, p, .001,
g2 5 .44. These two intergroup bias measures (i.e.,
evaluation and allocation) were moderately corre-
lated, r 5 .32, p , .05. Because the pattern of other
findings associated with these measures did not
differ, both scores were standardized and an average
of the two was used for later analyses as an overall
measure of intergroup bias.
Intragroup Measures
Table 2 shows the means for each inclusion mea-
sure. As expected, children anticipated that norma-
tive members would be includedmore by their group
than deviant members. They also expected that mem-
bers fromopposing groupswould be includedmore if
they were deviant than if they were normative. In line
with previous research (e.g., Abrams, Rutland, &
Cameron, 2003), the raw inclusion scores for each
member (Table 2) were combined into a single index
of differential inclusion (Table 1). A more positive
differential inclusion score reflects that the child
believes that each groupwill prefer its own normative
members and the other group’s deviant members.
The overall differential inclusion mean score differed
significantly from the zero point (M 5 1.29, SD 5
1.62), t(45) 5 5.42, p , .001, partial g2 5 .40, showing
that children did show significant levels of differen-
tial inclusion as expected.
Evaluations and allocations for members showed
a similar pattern as shown in Table 2. Specifically,
normative out-group members were evaluated sig-
nificantly less positively and allocated less than all
other members. Following the method used by
Abrams, Rutland, and Cameron (2003; see also
Table 1), the evaluations were combined into a single
index of differential evaluation. The overall level of
differential evaluation was significantly higher than
zero (M5 1.37, SD5 2.07), t(45)5 4.49, p, .001, g25
.31. Similarly, the allocation scores were combined
into a single index of differential allocation. The overall
level of differential allocationwas significantly higher
than zero (M5 2.00, SD5 4.47), t(45)5 3.04, p, .005,
g2 5 .17. The differential evaluation and allocation
scores were significantly correlated, r 5 .53, p , .001.
Thus overall, children significantly favored members
from either group who showed relatively greater
preference for the participant’s group.
Hypothesis Tests
In line with the intergroup– intragroup differentia-
tionhypothesis, differential evaluation anddifferential
allocationwere significantly related to intergroup bias,
r(46)5 .54, p, .001 and r5 .30, p,.05, respectively. In
line with the inclusion-related judgment hypothesis,
differential inclusion was positively related to differ-
ential evaluation, r(46) 5 .29, p , .05, and differential
allocation, r 5 .40, p , .01. Differential inclusion was
not related to intergroup bias, r(46)5 .16.
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations for Inclusion, Evaluation, and Allocation Measures in Study 1
Group In-group Out-group
Member Normative Deviant Normative Deviant
Inclusion by member’s group 3.91a (1.05) 3.70 (1.23) 3.74a (1.39) 3.67 (1.19)
Inclusion by other group 2.76b (1.39) 3.74a (1.20) 2.57b (1.19) 3.89a (1.20)
Evaluation 4.11a (1.18) 4.02a (1.22) 2.78b (1.28) 4.07a (1.14)
Allocation 8.15a (2.22) 8.26a (1.47) 5.70b (2.10) 7.80a (1.65)
Note.Means with different subscripts (within columns for inclusion and within rows for all measures) differ significantly by pairwise t test
(all ps , .001).
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The motivational hypothesis is that the relation-
ship between differential inclusion and differential
evaluation should be larger when intergroup bias is
high. A similar hypothesis would be advancedwhen
differential allocation is used as the dependent
measure. Table 3 and Figures 1a and 1b show the
results of multiple regression analyses used to test
the interactive effect of intergroup bias and dif-
ferential inclusion on differential evaluation and
differential allocation, respectively. Following pro-
cedures for testing interactions with multiple regres-
sion (cf. Aiken & West, 1991; Preacher, 2003), all the
independent variables were standardized so that
each had a mean of zero before computing the
interaction term.
When differential evaluation was the dependent
variable, there was a significant main effect of inter-
group bias, a marginally significant effect of differen-
tial inclusion, and a significant interaction between
intergroup bias and differential inclusion. Consistent
with the motivational hypothesis, simple slopes anal-
yses showed that among children who showed lower
levels of intergroup bias, there was no significant
relationship between differential inclusion and dif-
ferential evaluation, B 5 .23, t 5 0.97, p . .33,
whereas among children who showed higher levels
of intergroup bias, the relationship between differen-
tial inclusion and differential evaluation was signifi-
cantly positive, B 5 .66, t 5 3.07, p , .005.
When differential allocation was the dependent
variable, there was a marginal main effect of inter-
group bias, a significant effect of differential inclu-
sion, and a significant interaction between intergroup
bias and differential inclusion. Simple slopes analyses
showed that among children who showed lower
levels of intergroup bias, there was no significant
relationship between differential inclusion and dif-
ferential allocation,B5.18, t5 0.67,whereas among
childrenwho showedhigher levels of intergroup bias,
the relationship between differential inclusion and
differential allocation was significantly positive, B 5
.81, t 5 3.57, p , .001. Figures 1a and 1b depict the
slopes for differential evaluation and differential
allocation, respectively, when differential inclusion
and intergroup bias are one standard deviation above
and below their respective means. For both depen-
dent variables, over 42% of the variance is accounted
for by their relationship with intergroup bias and
differential inclusion.
Finally, all the analyses were repeated using either
intergroup evaluation bias or intergroup allocation
bias as independent variables rather than the com-
bined index. The interaction effects with differential
inclusion and simple slopes analyses showed the
same significant differences in both cases. The anal-
yses were also repeated using a combined (average of
standardized) differential evaluation and differential
allocation score as the dependent variable. This
revealed significant effects of differential inclusion,
b5 .28, t5 2.42, p, .05, intergroup bias, b5 .45, t5
3.82, p, .001, R25 .34, F(2, 43)5 10.85, p, .001, and
a significant interaction between intergroup bias and
differential inclusion, b5 .34, t5 2.90, p, .01, DR25
.11, F(3, 42) 5 11.29, p , .001. Details are available on
request from the first author.
Discussion
In line with previous research (Abrams & Rutland,
2008), children showed significant intergroup bias,
significant differential inclusion, and significant dif-
ferential evaluation of (and allocation to) group
members. In line with the DSGD model, the children
who showedmost intergroup bias also showed stron-
ger differential evaluation in favor of both in-group
and out-group peers who supported the in-group.
Moreover, children who had developed an under-
standing of differential inclusion also showed stron-
ger differential evaluation between peers. Finally, this
significant relationship was stronger when children
were motivated to support their in-group (i.e., they
showed high intergroup bias).
Table 3
Regression Analyses in Study 1
Dependent variable Independent variable b t DR2 F
Differential evaluation Intergroup bias .51 4.03***
Differential inclusion .21 1.69y .34 10.88***
Intergroup Bias  Differential Inclusion .28 2.34* .08 9.83***
Differential allocation Intergroup bias .24 1.98y
Differential inclusion .32 2.44* .35 7.70***
Intergroup Bias  Differential Inclusion .32 2.39* .08 7.84***
yp , .10. *p , .05. ***p , .001.
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This is the first time that these effects have been
shown within a minimal intergroup setting. It is also
the first time they have been shown using a design
asking children to judge normative and deviant peers
from both an in-group and an out-group. It is impor-
tant that the level of differential inclusion was signif-
icant because it shows that children can infer that
group loyalty norms are held by peers even when the
groups are conceptual and do not have a history or an
objective reality and even when children have not
been subjected to or witnessed conformity pressures
from other members of the group. This represents
a new finding in the developmental intergroup and
peer relation literatures and provides clear support
for assumptions in the DSGD model.
A further new finding is that children showed
significant differential evaluation by choosing to
distinguish out-group deviants (favorably) from out-
group normative members. The fact that children are
able to ‘‘reserve’’ their less positive evaluations for
out-group normative members is consistent with the
idea that intergroup biases in later childhood may
shift to a focus on out-groups rather than just being
positive about the in-group (cf. Aboud, 2003;Nesdale,
2001). The fact that children used differential evalu-
ation in a different way from previous research, but
still did so to selectively support the in-group, attests
to the DSGD model’s assumption that children learn
to bolster the in-group by strategically targeting their
evaluations of particular group members (cf. Abrams
et al., 2007).
The data also supported the intergroup– intragroup
differentiation hypothesis. Children who showed
more intergroup bias also showed more intragroup
differentiation in their evaluations and allocations to
group members. Moreover, in support of the inclu-
sion-related judgment hypothesis, these intragroup
judgments were reliably associated with children’s
perceptions of the different ways each group would
judge the members (differential inclusion). The pres-
ent findings also extend previous research by show-
ing that the relationships among intergroup bias
and intragroup judgments were similar in form re-
gardless of whether differential evaluations or differ-
ential allocations served as the dependent variable.
Finally, the test of the DSGD motivational hypoth-
esis was consistent with the prediction that children
use their evaluations and allocations to peermembers
in a motivated fashion. Specifically, children who
showed greater intergroup bias related their judg-
ments of differential inclusion more strongly to their
differential evaluations of, and allocations to, group
members. This is highly consistent with the DSGD
model’s expectation that differential evaluation of
group members serves social identity and that it
occurs in concert with, rather than opposition to,
evaluation of groups as a whole. In addition, the fact
that the motivational hypothesis was upheld for both
evaluation- and allocation-dependent measures
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Figure 1. Study 1: Motivational hypothesis. Effects of intergroup
bias and differential inclusion on (a) differential evaluation and
(b) differential allocations.
Note. Simple slopes are depicted for values of intergroup bias and
differential inclusion that are 1 SD above (high) and below (low)
their respective means.
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Study 2: Morality and Domain Specificity
Study 1, and previous research (e.g., Abrams et al.,
2007), focused on judgments about peer group mem-
bers who contravene or conform to group loyalty
norms (which imply contrastingbehavior formembers
of different groups). Loyalty norms are arguably
a particular property of group membership that
may be, within cultural limits, necessary for groups
to function coherently (Abrams, Ando, & Hinkle,
1998; Levine & Moreland, 2002; van Vugt & Hart,
2004). However, children’s inferences or understand-
ing that in-groups and out-groups expect their mem-
bers to be loyal and vice versa does not preclude the
possibility that children will employ other criteria for
evaluating individual group members. In particular,
research on moral development shows that children
understand and use moral principles when forming
judgments from an early age (as young and 2.5 years
of age; Smetana, 1985).
Children’s evaluations of peer behavior in any
context may reflect a multitude of factors (Killen,
2007; Turiel, 1998) relating to considerations of the self
(e.g., individual autonomy), group (e.g., norms or
social conventions), and morality (e.g., fairness or
justice). Importantly, studies of social –moral reason-
ing in children indicate that these concerns do not
develop in a hierarchical form; rather, they appear to
emerge independently and simultaneously in devel-
opment (Killen, 2007; Killen & Smetana, 2006). There-
fore, Study2analyzeshowchildren employbothmoral
and social-conventional (group-based) criteria such as
loyalty when evaluating in-group and out-group peer
members who deviate according to moral principles.
The overarching expectation for the present study
is that childrenwill differentiate among peers both on
the basis of group membership and on the basis of
individual morality. Thus, children should favor in-
group peers over out-group peers but also favor peers
from either group who behave according to moral
principles over morally deviant peers from each
group. Moreover, because these types of judgments
involve different domains of reasoning (Turiel, 1998),
group- and morality-based judgments should occur
in parallel and be independent of each other.
A domain independence hypothesis and a domain
specificity hypothesis are proposed. In order to test
these hypotheses, judgments of peers are operation-
alized according to whether children distinguish
among peers based on the group to which the peer
belongs and to the morality of the peer’s behavior. As
in Study 1, measures include intergroup bias and
inclusion, evaluation, and allocations of individual
group members. The intragroup measures are oper-
ationalized in terms of group- and morality-based
judgments.
The domain independence hypothesis holds that
group- and morality-based judgments should be unre-
lated.Thus, group-based inclusion shouldbepositively
related to group-based evaluations and allocations but
not to morality-based ones. Similarly, although moral-
ity-based inclusion should be positively related to
morality-based evaluations and allocations, it should
not be related to group-based evaluations.
The domain specificity hypothesis holds that SGD
effects will arise for group-based judgments but not
morality-based judgments. Study 1 set out the inter-
group– intragroup differentiation, inclusion-based
judgment, and the motivational hypotheses. In Study
2, for group-based judgments, all three hypotheses
should be supported because social identity is rele-
vant to these judgments. For morality-based judg-
ments, there should be a relationship between
inclusion and evaluation/allocations at the intra-
group level. However, these should not be related to
intergroup bias and should not be affected by social
identity because intergroup bias and social identity
are not relevant to the moral dimension. Thus, for
morality-based judgments, support is expected only
for the inclusion-based judgment hypothesis.
Multiple Classification Ability
The prediction of domain independence is based
on prior research inmoral development (e.g., Killen&
Smetana, 2006). However, it is conceivable that other
variables may simultaneously affect children’s use of
both group- and morality-based sets of criteria. The
present research investigates the role of multiple
classification ability in this respect.
According to cognitive developmental theory (cf.
Aboud, 1988; Bigler & Liben, 1992, 2006, 2007), older
children should have better multiple classification
skill, which should underpin developmental differ-
ences in intergroup bias because it enables children to
judge one another not just on the basis of simple social
category memberships but by using multiple ways
of categorizing. Multiple classification skill may be
particularly relevant in cases where children are
asked tomakenearly simultaneous judgments of indi-
viduals who differ both between and within groups.
Therefore, Study 2 included a measure of multiple
classification skill (Abrams et al., 2007) to investigate
its role. Specifically, based on cognitive developmen-
tal theory, the multiple classification hypothesis is that
better multiple classification ability should be asso-
ciated with reduced intergroup bias. In addition, it
could be predicted that multiple classification ability
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should be associated with increased within-group
differentiation such that children should focus on
individual differences (in morality) and not just
group membership.
Previous DSGD research (e.g., Abrams, Rutland, &
Cameron, 2003)hasusedageasaproxy for thepresence
of developmental processes such as multiple classifi-
cation, but it has not until recently examined those
processes directly (e.g., Abrams et al., 2007). The
present research investigates the role of multiple clas-
sification ability but recognizes that other variables
such as social experience and social perspective taking
also covary with age (Abrams & Rutland, 2008).
Therefore, age-related differences may exist above
and beyond effects of multiple classification ability.
Morality-based inclusion (Killen & Smetana, 2006) is
thought to occurearly in childhood, andunderstanding
of group loyalty norms (Abrams, Rutland, & Cameron,
2003) appears to be well established by approximately
7 – 8 years. Therefore, to allow investigation of the role
of multiple classification ability and independent ef-
fects associatedwith age, this studymeasuredmultiple
classification ability and sampled children from two
distinct age-groups, those aged between 5 and 7 years
and those between 9 and 11 years.
In summary, the present study asked children to
judge peers of aminimal in-group andout-groupwho
adhered to (i.e., normative) or transgressed (i.e.,
deviant)moral principles. Group identification, inter-
group judgments and intragroup inclusion, evalua-
tion, and allocations were measured. To test the
domain independence and domain specificity hypo-
theses, group- andmorality-based indiceswerederived
from each intragroup measure.
Method
Participants
There were 121 participants, including 74 females
and 47males from two age groups: 5 – 7 years (n5 61,
M5 6 years 2months, SD5 4months, mode5 6) and
10 – 11 years (n 5 60, M 5 10 years 2 months, SD 5
3.7 months, mode 5 10). Participants were tested at
their school, which was based in the same local
education authority, and had the same demographic
profile as participants in Study 1. All children were
White British and from predominantly middle-class
backgrounds. All participants had consent from their
parent or guardian to participate.
Procedure and Materials
The procedure closely followed that of Study 1.
Participantswere assigned, ostensibly randomly, to the
diamond team and then answered questions to eval-
uate the two teams and two peer members from each
team. To measure how much participants identified
with their team, three questions were asked: ‘‘How do
you feel about being amember of the diamond team?’’
‘‘How much do you think you would like to be
a member of the star team’’ (reverse scored), and
‘‘How much would you like to change teams and be
on the star team instead of the diamond team?’’
(reverse scored). All the responses were measured by
the previously described feeling faces scale.
The next question was a group allocation measure.
Participants were asked to allocate six bags of candy
to the teams by drawing a diamond shape or a star
shape under each cartoon drawing of six pictures. In
this study, the candy measure was only presented
once. Intergroup evaluation was measured in the
same way as Study 1.
The four peer members were described using the
same method of presentation as Study 1. However, the
descriptions varied in terms of how morally the chil-
dren behaved in their social interactions. Specifically,
onemoralpeermemberwasdescribed thus, ‘‘[member]
always takes turns anddoes notmind if other people go
ahead in the queue. [Member] is careful not to hurt the
feelings of other teamplayers duringgames.’’ The other
moral peer member was described thus, ‘‘[member]
always shares with other people. [Member] is also very
helpful to other team members if they are having
a problem.’’ These two descriptions were counterbal-
anced for in-group and out-group members.
In contrast, one immoralpeermemberwasdescribed
thus, ‘‘[member] doesn’t take turns and pushes people
to get ahead in the queue. [Member] tries to be better
than other people on the teameven if itmakes them feel
bad.’’ The other was described thus, ‘‘[member] some-
times isvery selfishwith toysandgames. [Member]will
not help other people on the team, even if they are
having problems.’’ Again, these descriptions were
counterbalanced across in-group and out-group peer
members. The choice of descriptions was determined
by the need to use behaviors that the younger aswell as
older children would understand to contravene moral
principles. Descriptions were based on examples and
operationalizations fromprevious research (e.g., Killen,
Margie, & Sinno, 2006). The aim was to tap into the
judgment that the person was unequivocally either
morally ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad,’’ rather than the loyal –dis-
loyal distinction in Study 1 or any other group-related
attributes. The order of presentation of in-group or out-
group members was also counterbalanced.
Group inclusion of, evaluations of, and allocation
to peer members were assessed in the same way as
Study 1.
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Participants then completed a measure of multiple
classification ability from previous research (Abrams
et al., 2007). Participants were asked to group red and
green triangles and crosses into a 2  2 grid using as
many or few squares in the grid as they pleased. If
participants sorted the objects by both shape and
color, they were given a score of 2. If they sorted the
objects only on one dimension, such as just shape or
just color, they were given a score of 1. If there was
no pattern of sorting the objects, they were given
a score of 0.
Demographic information about each participant
was also collected including the participant’s age,
birthday, gender, and ethnicity.
Results
The design was 2 (age: 5 – 6 years vs. 10 – 11 years)
Between Participants  2 (group: in-group vs. out-
group) Within Participants  2 (member: moral vs.
immoral) Within Participants. However, unless men-
tioned later, there were no significant effects of
participants’ gender, order of measures, or age group.
Therefore, these variables were not included in the
analyses reported below.
Intergroup Measures
Evaluations of the in-group and out-group dif-
fered, showing significant bias in favor of the in-
group (M5 1.68, SD5 1.81), t(119)5 10.21, p , .001,
g2 5 .47. Intergroup allocation also significantly
favored the in-group (M 5 3.45, SD 5 1.18), t(120) 5
4.25, p , .001, g2 5 .13. The two intergroup bias
measures were moderately correlated, r 5 .27, p ,
.005.As in Study 1, both scoreswere standardized and
the mean of these served as an overall measure of
intergroup bias.
Intragroup Measures
Table 4 shows the means and pairwise differences
for each inclusion measure, the evaluation and allo-
cationmeasures, and the typicalitymeasure. Children
included moral members more than immoral mem-
bers within both groups. They also expected that in-
groupmoralmemberswould be includedmoreby the
in-group than by the out-group. Children favored
moral over immoral members. However, they also
favored moral in-group members over moral out-
group members and, on allocations, also favored
immoral in-group members over immoral out-group
members.
Domain Independence of Group- and Morality-Based
Responses
For each of the inclusion, evaluation, allocation,
and typicality measures, two simple indices were
composed, reflecting either group- or morality-based
responses. Group-based inclusion is the mean of inclu-
sion judgments about same group members (i.e., in-
group inclusion of in-group members and out-group
inclusion of out-group members) minus the mean of
expected judgments about opposite group members
(i.e., in-group inclusion of out-group members and
out-group inclusion of in-group members). The dif-
ference score showed that inclusion was higher
within than between groups (M 5 0.24, SD 5 0.72),
indicating a significant level of group-based inclu-
sion, t(120) 5 3.72, p , .001, g2 5 .10. Morality-based
inclusion is the mean of inclusion judgments about
moral in-group and out-group members minus the
mean of inclusion judgments about both immoral
members. The difference score showed that inclusion
was significantly higher for moral members (M 5
2.06, SD 5 1.20), t(120) 5 18.84, p , .001, g2 5 .75.
Comparison revealed that levels of morality- and
group-based inclusion scores differed significantly,
t(120)5 14.25, p, .001, g25 .63. Thus, although both
morality- and group-based inclusion were significant
in children’s judgments, the effect size for morality-
based inclusion was significantly more substantial,
Z 5 7.508, p , .001. Consistent with the domain
independence hypothesis and importantly for sub-
sequent analyses, the two indices were uncorrelated,
r(121) 5 .001.
On a similar basis as for inclusion, an index of
group-based differential evaluation was computed by
subtracting the evaluations of both out-group mem-
bers from the evaluations of both in-group members.
The difference between these scores was significant,
t(120) 5 2.89, p , .005, g2 5 .07, demonstrating in-
group favoring group-based differential evaluation
(M 5 0.42, SD 5 1.58). Morality-based evaluation was
computed by subtracting the evaluations of both
immoral members from evaluations of both moral
members. The significant difference between these
scores (M5 6.00, SD5 2.28), t(120)5 28.83, p, .001,
g25 .88, indicates favoritism towardmoral members.
Group- and morality-based differential evaluation
scores differed significantly, t(120) 5 20.70, p , .001,
g25 .78. Aswith the inclusionmeasures, participants
showed much stronger differentiation in morality-
based than group-based evaluations. In line with
the domain independence hypothesis, the two forms
of evaluation were not significantly related, r5 .15,
p . .10.
454 Abrams, Rutland, Ferrell, and Pelletier
Similar analyses for group-based allocation (M 5
8.26, SD 5 6.54) and morality-based allocation (M 5
2.55, SD 5 4.90) showed significant in-group favorit-
ism and significant moral favoritism, respectively,
t(120) 5 5.67, p , .001, g2 5 .22, and t(120) 5 13.78,
p, .001, g2 5 .62. These scores differed significantly,
t(120) 5 7.60, p , .001, g2 5 .33, and were uncorre-
lated, r 5 .01.
In summary, across the intragroupmeasures, levels
of morality- and group-based differentiation were
both significant. Consistentwith the domain indepen-
dence hypothesis, there was no significant relation-
ship between morality- and group-based responses,
demonstrating that they are used as independent
criteria in children’s judgments.
To facilitate analysis of the relationships among the
different types of intergroup and intragroup re-
sponses, all variables were standardized. The stan-
dardized intragroup allocation and evaluation
measures were averaged to provide a single index
of intragroup bias comparable to the intergroup bias
measure (findings remain consistent when the meas-
ures are not aggregated). Table 5 presents the corre-
lations among these measures.
Domain Specificity
Table 5 shows that intergroup bias is significantly
positively related to group-based bias but not to
morality-based bias. Thus, the intergroup – intra-
group differentiation hypothesis is upheld in the
group-based but not the morality-based domain,
supporting the domain specificity hypothesis. Note
that intergroup bias is also significantly negatively
associated with morality-based inclusion but mar-
ginally significantly positively associated with group-
based inclusion even though the two inclusion
measures are themselves unrelated.
The inclusion-based judgment hypothesis (Study
1) was supported separately in each domain. Moral-
ity-based inclusion is most strongly and positively
related to morality-based bias, whereas group-based
inclusion is most strongly and positively related to
group-based bias. This shows that morality-based
Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations for Inclusion, Evaluation, and Allocation Measures in Study 2
Group In-group Out-group
Member Moral Immoral Moral Immoral
Inclusion by member’s group 4.29a (1.10) 1.63c (1.05) 3.92a (1.24) 1.84c (1.18)
Inclusion by other group 3.56b (1.45) 1.98c (1.25) 4.13ab (1.19) 1.92c (1.15)
Evaluation 4.70a (0.75) 1.63c (1.05) 4.41b* (0.95) 1.49c (1.01)
Allocation 10.32a (2.20) 5.91c (2.26) 8.76b (2.13) 4.92d (2.16)
Note.Means with different subscripts (within columns for inclusion and within rows for all measures) differ significantly by pairwise t test
(all ps , .001 except *p , .01).
Table 5
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations Among Variables in Study 2
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Age (months) 98.40 24.46
2. In-group identification 3.59 .12
3. Intergroup bias (standardized) 0.00 .80 .10 .58***
4. Morality-based inclusion 2.06 1.20 .15 .01 .22*
5. Group-based inclusion .24 .72 .16y .10 .17y .01
6. Morality-based bias (standardized) 0.00 .79 .05 .03 .11 .44*** .12
7. Group-based bias (standardized) 0.00 .70 .18y .22* .37*** .21* .38*** .11
8. MCS 1.52 .73 .35*** .05 .30*** .18* .07 .16y .12
9. MCS with age partialed .10 .29*** .14 .01 .19* .06
10. Age with MCS partialed .14 .01 .09 .14 .12 .15
Note. N 5 121. MCS 5multiple classification score.
yp , .10. *p , .05. ***p , .001.
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judgments and group-based judgments are generally
distinct not just within types of measure but also
between measures.
The three identification itemswere factor analyzed
and found to load on a single factor, accounting for
59% of the variance (all loadings . .63). These were
combined to provide an index of group identification.
The mean score was 3.59 on a scale from 1 to 5 (SD5
1.01). Consistent with the domain specificity hypoth-
esis, Table 5 shows that group identification is signif-
icantly related to intergroup bias and group-based
bias but is unrelated to morality-based bias or any
measures of inclusion.
The independence of identification from the inclu-
sion measures allows a test of the motivational
hypothesis (Study 1) by examining how identification
might moderate the relationship between inclusion
and bias measures. Moreover, the present study
enabled us to test the domain specificity of the
motivational hypothesis. This assumes that group-
based inclusion should be more strongly related to
group-related bias when identification is higher.
However, levels of identification should notmoderate
the relationships between morality-based inclusion
and morality-based bias or morality-based inclusion
and group-based bias.
The identificationmeasure, the group-based inclu-
sion measure, and the morality-based inclusion mea-
sure were standardized. Interaction terms between
identification and the relevant inclusion measure
were computed. Group-based bias or morality-based
bias was a dependent variable in multiple regression
analyses to test the hypothesized interaction effects.
Group-based bias. When identification and moral-
ity-based inclusion were used as independent varia-
bles, there was a significant effect of identification,
b5 .22, t5 2.50, p, .05; a significant negative effect of
morality-based inclusion, b 5 .21, t 5 2.35, p , .05;
and no interaction, b 5 .06, t 5 0.70, R2 5 .10, F(3,
117)5 4.08, p, .01. In contrast, the analysis involving
identification and group-based inclusion revealed
a significant effect of identification, b 5 .19, t 5 2.20,
p , .05; a significant effect of group-based inclusion,
b5 .36, t5 4.31, p, .001; and a significant interaction,
b5 .20, t5 2.43, p, .05,R25 .22, F(3, 117)5 10.83, p,
.001. As shown in Figure 2, analysis of simple slopes
showed that the relationship between inclusion and
bias was only marginally significant when identifica-
tion was low, B5 .14, t5 1.94, p, .06, but larger and
highly significant when identification was high, B 5
.37, t 5 5.22, p , .001.
Morality-based bias. When identification and
morality-based inclusion were used as independent
variables, there was no effect of identification, b 5
.03, t 5 .35; a significant effect of morality-based
inclusion, b 5 .44, t 5 5.27, p , .001; and no
interaction, b 5 .09, t 5 1.02, R2 5 .20, F(3, 117) 5
9.66, p , .001. The comparable analysis involving
identification and group-based inclusion as indepen-
dent variables revealed no significant effects (0. b.
.12 for all effects), R2 5 .02, F(3, 117) 5 0.78. Thus,
children who believed that their peers would more
strongly favor moral over immoral members made
similar judgments themselves, but their judgments
were not affected by how strongly they identified
with the group or their beliefs about how peers judge
in-group and out-group members.
In summary, children’s relative bias for in-group
individuals over out-group individuals was associ-
ated with stronger identification with the group,
a lower belief that peers would usemorality as a basis
for judging members and a stronger belief that peers
would use group membership as a basis for judging
members. Moreover, themore strongly children iden-
tifiedwith the in-group, themore closely relatedwere
their judgments of group-based inclusion and their
own group-based differential bias toward members.
These findings are consistent with domain specificity.
Multiple Classification and Age
Table 5 shows that multiple classification skill was
significantly positively correlated with age, r 5 .35,




















Low  Group Based Differential Inclusion 
High Group Based Differential Inclusion
Figure 2. Study 2: Simple slopes showing the relationship between
differential inclusion and group-based evaluations as a function of
identification with the in-group.
Note. Simple slopes are depicted for values of group identification
and differential inclusion that are 1 SD above (high) and below
(low) their respective means.
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multiple classification hypothesis, it was associated
with lower intergroup bias, r 5 .30, p , .001. To
unconfound age andmultiple classification skill, their
partial correlations with other measures were exam-
ined (Table 5).Whenmultiple classification scorewas
partialed out, agewas unrelated to any biasmeasures.
In contrast, when age was partialed out, multiple
classification score remained significantly associated
with lower intergroup bias, pr5.25, p, .01 andwas
significantly associated with higher morality-based
bias, pr5 .19, p, .05. These findings support the idea
that multiple classification ability is likely to play
a role in both intergroup and individual peer judg-
ments in a minimal group context. Children with
better multiple classification skills tended to focus
less on groups andmore on individualmoralitywhen
forming their peer judgments.
Discussion
Study 2 revealed that when children judged in-
group and out-group peer members whose behavior
was moral and immoral, they differentiated more in
terms of morality than group membership. However,
they continued to show significant levels of inter-
group bias and group-based bias. Moreover, there
was a systematic relationship among the measures.
Consistent with the domain independence hypothe-
sis, the group- and morality-based forms of each
measure were unrelated to one another. Children
who showed more morality-based inclusion showed
more morality-based bias but not more group-based
bias. Children who showed more group-based in-
clusion showed more group-based bias but not
morality-basedbias.Moreover, consistentwithdomain
specificity, children who identified more with their
group showed more intergroup bias and group-based
bias but not morality-based bias. Finally, children who
identified more with their group related their group-
based inclusion more strongly to their group-based
bias, whereas identification did not alter the associa-
tion between morality-based inclusion and bias.
The results are particularly interesting as they shed
light on how children approach morality in inter-
group situations. It does not appear that children’s
responses to in-group and out-group peers require
a trade-off between favoring people because of their
group membership versus favoring them because of
their morality. Instead, the present study shows that
when moral breaches are objectively uncorrelated
with group membership, children use both morality
and group membership as independent bases of
judgment. In this respect, the results of Study 2 are
also broadly in line with one of the few studies of
adults that systematically varied likability and group
membership as entirely within-participants factors
(Bown & Abrams, 2003).
Finally, consistent with cognitive developmental
theory (Aboud, 1988; Bigler & Liben, 1992), older
children showed better multiple classification skill,
but independently of age, multiple classification skill
was associated with lowered intergroup bias.
Although multiple classification skill was unrelated
to group-based bias toward members, it was related
to increased morality-based bias. Thus, children with
better multiple classification skills focused less on
intergroup category differences andmore on individ-
ual morality differences within the categories. In
addition, note a negative correlation between moral-
ity-based inclusion and both intergroup bias and
group-based bias, which may indicate that multiple
classificationmay be involved in amore complexway
that connects their variables. Thus, there is some
evidence that multiple classification does influence
both intergroup and intragroup judgments, though
not necessarily in a way that makes the two sets of
judgments interdependent.
General Discussion
The two studies in this article represent the first tests
of the DSGD model using a minimal intergroup
setting and the first to use a fully within-participants
design. The findings provide three new lines of
evidence for the model. First, even when children
directly compare normative anddeviant in-group and
out-group peers and even when the groups are com-
pletely novel and minimal (both previously untested
contexts), children still show motivated biases and
make use of their expectations of group-based inclu-
sion. Second, these effects are specific to group-based
judgments and do not occur in morality-based judg-
ments. Third, multiple classification ability is impli-
cated in both the level of intergroup bias and the use of
morality-based judgments of peers within groups.
Taken together, this evidence extends the generaliz-
ability of the DSGD model by demonstrating that
intergroup bias and evaluations of peers are system-
atically related and that evaluations are positively
correlated with perceptions of peer group inclusion,
and this relationship is motivated by social identity.
Study 1 showed that when peer members of
minimal in-groups and out-groups deviate in terms
of group loyalty, children reserve their least positive
responses for normative out-group members. In sup-
port of the intergroup – intragroup differentiation
hypothesis, children who are more biased in favor
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of their in-group as a whole differentiate more
strongly within the group. In support of the inclu-
sion-related judgment and motivational hypotheses,
those who are most biased at the intergroup level use
their understanding of differential inclusion more
systematically as a basis for their allocations to and
evaluations of group members. The fact that these
findings have been obtained in an intergroup relation-
ship that is extremelyminimal is important because it
shows that children are able to generate representa-
tions of groupprocesseswithout having to experience
group norms specifically or directly within a particu-
lar intergroup setting. This suggests that childrenmay
be generalizing from their social experiences to make
assumptions about group functioning, particularly in
terms of loyalty norms.
Previous research has shown that children use both
moral and social-conventional or psychological rea-
soning to explain decision making about inclusion
and exclusion within peer groups (Killen et al., 2002,
2006). Social-cognitive domain theory (Killen et al.,
2002; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Smetana, 1995; Turiel,
1983) contends that reasoning about morality and
social differentiation among peers reflect two distinct
domains of knowledge, the moral (e.g., issues of
fairness) and social-conventional (e.g., conformity to
group norms and customs). This theory contrasts
with global stage approaches to social –moral devel-
opment (Kohlberg, 1984; Piaget, 1932) because it
acknowledges that these different domains of knowl-
edge can inform both reasoning and judgments in
ontological development (Turiel, 1983). The present
research supports social-cognitive domain theory by
showing that morality- and group-based judgments
are not opposites. Rather, children employ both when
engaging in social exclusion and peer rejection.
Children in Study 2 related their identificationwith
a group selectively to group-based judgments. This
suggests a motivational explanation for why, though
children develop an understanding of fairness early
between 2 and 3 years (Nucci&Turiel, 1978), they also
heed social-conventional criteria (i.e., groupmember-
ship) when evaluating peers. The DSGD model’s
hypotheses for inclusion-based judgment and moti-
vation were clearly supported but only for group-
based judgments. Group-based reasoning about and
responses to peers are most likely to be employed
when children strongly identify with their in-group
within a salient intergroup context.
Study 2 also demonstrated that although minimal
intergroup bias is lower among children with better
multiple classification skill, this does not appear to be
because they make greater use of morality-based
judgments or lesser use of judgments based on group
membership. Indeed, multiple classification skill is
associated with greater morality-based bias. This is
consistent with the idea that greater multiple classi-
fication skill may equip children with more flexibility
in the way they perceive group members. Future
research is certainly needed to see whether it also
means that they always employ universalistic (e.g.,
moral) dimensions rather than relativistic (e.g.,
group-based) dimensions for evaluating group
members.
Future Directions and Conclusions
The present research constructed a highly minimal
intergroup context, but it also establishes some level
of competitiveness between the groups. Thus, to some
extent, children may have applied the informal rules
of competition when making their judgments.
Although competition does boost SGD (cf. Abrams,
Rutland, & Cameron, 2003; Marques et al., 2001), it is
not necessary for SGD to occur. Moreover, given that
children had no ideawho the groupmembers were or
who else belonged to their own group, the situation
was still substantially more minimal than has been
used in previous research. However, future research
should investigate whether DSGD effects arise in
situations where the groups are completely indepen-
dent or are actually cooperating to see whether
children follow different norms (e.g., characters who
would be deemed ‘‘disloyal’’ in competition might be
deemed ‘‘noble’’ in cooperative situations).
It could be argued that immoral behavior overlaps
with general ‘‘niceness.’’ However, research with
adults shows that if the specific dimension of likabil-
ity is manipulated, the black sheep effect occurs
(Marques et al., 1988). Thus, if the morality manipu-
lation in the present research had only tapped likabil-
ity, we would not have predicted or obtained distinct
effects. More importantly, niceness is a personality
attribute that could vary as a function of the perceiver
as well as the target (e.g., people might view others as
unlikable simply because they belong to a different
group or have a different appearance). In contrast,
research on moral development has shown that
children in awide range of cultures believe thatmoral
principles (i.e., equality, justice, and fairness) univer-
sally apply to all individuals (Killen&Smetana, 2006).
Consistent with these findings, the present research
shows that children do apply these moral criteria to
both in-group and out-group peer behavior but that
they simultaneously apply group-based criteria for
evaluating these peers.
Abrams et al. (2005) and Marques et al. (2001) used
the term ‘‘generic norm’’ to refer to a norm that is
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shared across all groups (e.g., to be successful). Future
research in both the adult and developmental litera-
tures is needed to see how and when people bring
generic norms into play when judging group mem-
bers. It is likely that some generic norms are nonmoral
but are more like social conventions that are used to
enhance groups competitively (e.g., valuing attractive-
ness, skillfulness). But other generic norms, perhaps
those that are embedded more in moral principles,
maybeones thatpeople advocate for allmembers of all
groups (e.g., that everyone should be fair).
In addition, it is possible that some group norms
may become so entrenched that they acquire the
status of principles (e.g., rules prescribed in some
religions) that have the subjective status of morals.
This may provide a basis for people to try to make
other groups adopt them (e.g., religious crusades).
Note that these different types of norm imply differ-
ent goals at the intergroup level. When social-
conventional generic norms are salient, people want
their group to be different from out-groups (e.g.,
better). When a norm becomes subjectively defined
as ‘‘moral,’’ people should want to convert out-
groups to adopt these norms (e.g., justifying military,
political, or religious domination). Although these
issues are beyond the scope of the present research,
future research should investigate children’s under-
standing of and reactions to deviation from different
types of in-group, out-group, and generic norms.
Future research should also investigate variables
that affect the relative weight children place on moral
and social-conventional criteria in different inter-
group relationships. For example, perceived out-
group threat may encourage children to base their
exclusion judgments more on group membership
factors than morality (Nesdale, Durkin, et al., 2005;
Nesdale, Maass, Durkin, & Griffiths, 2005), and ex-
clusion social norms (Jackson et al., 2006; Ojala &
Nesdale, 2004; Rutland,Cameron,Milne,&McGeorge,
2005)may also facilitate the use of social-conventional
reasoning over morality when children differentiate
within the peer group.
In conclusion, the present research supports the
principal predictions from the DSGD model within
aminimal group context.Moreover, Study 2 extended
the model by demonstrating the independent contri-
bution of morality-based and group membership –
based responses that affect children’s social exclusion
within the peer group. In middle childhood, children
infer group loyalty norms and consider both the
moral and the social-conventional domains of knowl-
edge when differentiating among peers. Significantly,
children with more advanced multiple classification
skill show reduced intergroup bias and increased use
of morality as a basis for judging peers. However,
with increasing social identification, children differ-
entiate among their peers more based upon group
membership but not necessarily morality. These find-
ings begin to provide an explanation for why, despite
their strong sense of morality, children still show
marked intergroup bias and peer social exclusion
duringmiddle childhood.We suggest that, to provide
a comprehensive account of peer exclusion, develop-
mental research on peer relations should consider
children’s understanding of group-based social rela-
tionships and not just the psychopathology of indi-
vidual children (Jackson et al., 2006; Juvonen et al.,
2006; Killen et al., 2002, 2006).
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